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State Intervention into the Lives of Single Mothers
and Their Children: Toward a Resolution of
Maternal Autonomy and Children's Needs
Christa Anders*
I. Introduction
Hester Prynne was condemned as an adulteress and forced to
wear the scarlet letter "A"; a "mark of shame."' Times have
changed since Nathaniel Hawthorne wrote his fictitious work
about the Puritan code. Women are no longer sent to jail nor os-
tracized by their communities for bearing a child "out-of-wedlock."
By 1960, five percent of all births were to single women. 2 Today,
almost one-fourth of all births are to single women. 3 This article
explores the ramifications of the increase in nonmarital births, ex-
amines various judicial and legislative responses, analyzes several
policy approaches to this social phenomena and proposes a system
designed to include the interests of all those involved. Single
mothers and their children present unique challenges to the social
welfare system, the legal system and society as a whole. The chal-
lenge is not necessarily to find a solution, for that implies that
there is a problem, and it is counterproductive to assume a prob-
* B.A. St. Olaf College; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School (1990);
M.A., Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs (1990).
The author would like to thank Laura Kadwell and Luanne Nyberg of the
Children's Defense Fund-Minnesota for their inspiration and support. The opinions
contained herein are solely those of the author.
1. Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter 50 (Running Press 1986) (1850).
Semantics, whether in a classic work or a law review article are of great signifi-
cance. The language used to describe the child born to a mother who is not married
to the biological father has gone through several phases. Though "bastardy" laws
are still on the books in some states, the term is generally no longer used. "Illegiti-
mate" has been replaced by the term "out-of-wedlock" and some scholars and au-
thors are now using the term "nonmarital" child. The author uses the term
nonmarital, though she is not completely comfortable with it. See Esther Wat-
tenberg, Establishing Paternity for Nonmarital Children, Public Welfare, Summer
1987, at 9, 10.
2. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 1977 61 (98th ed. 1977).
3. U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of
the United States 1989, 66 (109th ed. 1989).
Law and Inequality
lem as the initial step.4 Rather, the challenge is to accept the real-
ity that the all-American, nuclear family is not the norm. There is
an urgent need to devise policies that support and strengthen all
families, however they may be comprised.
Various factors explain the exponential increase in the
number of nonmarital births. They include: a decrease in the
stigma associated with nonmarital births, an increase in
nonmarital conception, an increase in the age at marriage, and the
large number of "baby boomers" passing through their teens and
twenties. 5
The decreasing stigmatization of women's behavior is a posi-
tive by-product of the passage of time. It is, nonetheless, true that
the increasing number of births, as a result of this destigmatiza-
tion, has been partially responsible for the dramatic and troubling
increase in the number of women and children living in poverty.
Indeed, the level of childhood poverty in the United States is
deplorable, with twenty percent of all children living in extreme
poverty.6 The statistics are even more shocking for nonmarital
children, with fifty-eight percent of these children living in pov-
erty.7 Women head the vast majority of these poverty-level
households.8
No single factor is responsible for the impoverished status of
so many of the households headed by single women. Interruption
4. If families headed by single women are regarded as "problems," then elimi-
nation of the problem would be the most obvious solution. Elimination of house-
holds headed by single women is, however, neither appropriate nor practical.
Indeed, the household headed by a single woman is the fastest-growing family type.
Paul Klauda, Peek Shows Gains for State, Shifting Makeup of Metro Area, Minne-
apolis Star Tribune, Apr. 19, 1990, at 1A, 8A, col. 2 (citing advance data from 1990
census report).
5. Ann Nichols-Casebolt, Paternity Adjudication: In the Best Interests of the
Out-of-Wedlock Child, 67 Child Welfare J. 245, 248 (1988).
6. Arlene Saluter, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't Commerce, Current Popu-
lation Reports, Series P-23, No. 163, Changes in American Family Life 25 (1989).
Twenty percent of all children in the United States are living in poverty. For black
and Hispanic children, the poverty rates are even more startling: 45% of black chil-
dren and 39% of Hispanic children are in poverty. Id. For children living in house-
holds headed by single women the poverty level is shocking. Forty-six percent of
white children, 68% of black children, and 70% of Hispanic children who live in sin-
gle female headed households are living in poverty. Id.
7. Victoria Schwartz Williams & Robert Williams, Identifying Daddy: The
Role of the Courts in Establishing Paternity, 28 The Judges' J., Summer 1989, at 41
(citing Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports,
Series P-23, No. 152, Child Support and Alimony: 1985 (1987) [hereinafter Census
Report]).
8. Almost 90% of all households headed by a single person are headed by wo-
men. Saluter, supra note 6, at 16. Forty-six percent of all households headed by
women live in poverty. Id. at 24. For households headed by black or Hispanic wo-
men, the poverty rate is 60%. Id.
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of education for child rearing, the lack of jobs with competitive
wages,9 the lack of affordable day care,' 0 wage discrimination in
the workplace 11 and the fact that the burden of child-rearing often
falls entirely on the mothers, are all factors that contribute to this
poverty. The reality is that most noncustodial fathers with depen-
dent children do not contribute to the support of their children.
According to the latest Bureau of the Census data only eleven per-
cent of never-married mothers receive any child support
payments.12
Policymakers must recognize the impact of this phenomena
on the lives of women and children. We need nationwide policies
and practices designed to mitigate and alleviate the burdens placed
upon families headed by single women. It is critical that these pol-
icies be responsive and well-informed.
Just as there are many factors contributing to the challenge
single mothers present, so are there numerous possible solutions.
Undoubtedly, one of the most significant contributing factors is the
lack of paternal involvement and support. While it is not possible
to legislate emotional attachment, it is possible to enforce the fi-
nancial duty that parents owe their children. Establishment of pa-
ternity is important because it is a necessary prerequisite for a
support order.13 It is estimated that paternity is established in
only twenty-five to thirty percent of all nonmarital births.14
Establishment of paternity confers benefits other than finan-
cial support upon the child. For instance, the child may gain ac-
cess to an otherwise inaccessible medical history.15 Additionally,
9. Marian Wright Edelman, Families in Peril 74 (1987).
10. Michael Harrington, The New American Poverty 202 (1984).
11. Mary Corcoran, Greg Duncan & Martha Hill, The Economic Fortunes of
Women and C0ildren: Lessons from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, in Wo-
men and Poverty 7, 9-14 (Barbara Gelpi ed. 1986).
12. Williams, supra note 7, at 41. Fewer than 18% of never-married mothers
had an enforceable order for child support compared to 68% of divorced or sepa-
rated mothers. Nichols-Casebolt, supra note 5, at 249. Having a child support order
does not guarantee payment. Enforcement procedures are improving, but many fa-
thers still do not pay the ordered support amount. The most recent Census Bureau
study on alimony and support payments indicates that, of the 4.4 million women
with an enforceable order for support, only 48% received the entire payment owed,
26% received partial payment and 26% received no support at all. Census Report,
supra note 7, at 1.
13. Office of Child Support Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Services, A Guide to Initiating a Paternity Consent Process 6 (1989) [hereinafter In-
itiating Paternity Consent].
14. Williams, supra note 7, at 3; Wattenberg, supra note 1, at 10 (citing informa-
tion from the Office of Child Support Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Services, Rockville, Maryland).
15. Wattenberg, supra note 1, at 10.
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the child is entitled to Social Security benefits,16 veteran's 17 and
worker's compensation dependent benefits,'8 possible inclusion in
health insurance coverage,S9 rights of inheritance and other survi-
vor benefits20 as well as psychological and social benefits. 21
In most jurisdictions, if a child is born to a woman who is
married, the child is presumed to be the child of the woman and
her husband.22 If a child is born to a woman who is not married,
there is no presumption of paternity. Procedures to establish the
paternity of a nonmarital child vary from state to state. All states
have a judicial procedure for establishing paternity, the over-
whelming number of which are civil in nature.23 In addition,
many states allow for the establishment of paternity through ad-
ministrative hearings or through voluntary acknowledgment.24
Paternity also may be legally established by the subsequent mar-
riage of the biological parents of a nonmarital child.25
The establishment of paternity, however, is not a cure-all nor





20. Anne Poulin, Illegitimacy and Family Privacy: A Note on Maternal Coop-
eration in Paternity Suits, 70 Nw. U.L. Rev. 910, 920 (1976).
21. Wattenberg, supra note 1, at 10. The establishment of paternity is benefi-
cial to others as well. Mothers of nonmarital children may receive monetary sup-
port. Fathers of nonmarital children also benefit in that they may be entitled to
physical and legal custody and visitation rights. See generally Carol Donovan, The
Uniform Parentage Act and Nonmarital Motherhood by Choice, 11 Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 193, 204-07 (1982). In addition, the father of a nonmarital child who has ac-
knowledged paternity must be given notice, and has the opportunity to request sole
custody, in the event that the mother decides to terminate her parental rights and
put the child up for adoption. Id. The grandparents of the child may also be enti-
tled to visitation rights. Finally, society benefits by having more children who are
supported by their natural parents, by having children with a stronger sense of
identity and by sending a message that all parents have a duty towards their chil-
dren. Id.
22. See, e.g., Unif. Parentage Act § 4, 9B U.L.A. 298-99 (1973).
23. See generally Williams, supra note 7, at 4. Though previously conducted in
the criminal courts, most jurisdictions now conduct paternity adjudications through
a civil process. See Note, The Burden of Proof in a Paternity Action, 25 J. Fain. L.
357, 357-58 (1986) (authored by Carol Browning). However, the proceedings have
retained some elements of a criminal proceeding, such as the right to a trial by jury
and the indigent defendant's right to counsel. See Williams, supra note 7, at 4. The
federal Family Support Act of 1988 requires that all states implement a simple civil
process for voluntary acknowledgment of paternity and a civil procedure for the ad-
judication of paternity in contested cases. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying
text.
24. See generally Initiating Paternity Consent, supra note 13. These acknowl-
edgements are known as a Declaration of Parentage, Acknowledgment of Paternity
or Affidavit of Legitimation. See, e.g., id. at 53, 71-72.
25. Unif. Parentage Act § 4, 9B U.L.A. 298-99 (1973).
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significant questions about family autonomy and an individual's
right to equal protection. 26 In order to establish paternity, the gov-
ernment must intrude into highly protected areas of life.27 The
question that must be addressed is: to what extent is that intrusion
desired? The values that shape the answer to this question also
play a primary role in other decisions that balance maternal and
child rights. In our increasingly complex world, these values are
gaining in import and impact.
This article focuses on the allowable extent of intrusion.
Three different levels of intervention, from the most to the least
intrusive, will be explored. The first part of the article examines
the system as it currently operates.28 The second part focuses on a
model characterized by high levels of government intervention. 29
The third part examines a model characterized by low levels of
government intervention.3 0 After evaluating the strengths and
weaknesses of each model, a new alternative will be presented and
discussed.31 This new model proposes a radical restructuring of
commonly held notions of both familial life and public assistance.
Such restructuring is necessary in order to eliminate the crisis fac-
ing so many of our nation's children and their families.
II. Three Models of Intervention
A. Model One: The Current Situation
At present, government intervention into the lives of single
mothers and their children for the purpose of establishing pater-
nity is predicated upon that family's application for and receipt of
public assistance benefits through the Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) program. The government's interest in a
child's paternity is aroused only if a single mother applies for wel-
fare. If a single mother does not apply for AFDC, the government
remains essentially disinterested and uninvolved. Non-public
assistance mothers also may avail themselves of the services of-
fered by the local Child Support Enforcement offices, 32 but gov-
26. See infra notes 138-214 and accompanying text. See also Donovan, supra
note 21; Poulin, supra note 20.
27. See infra notes 161-71 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 32-224 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 225-53 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 254-61 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 262-70 and accompanying text.
32. The federal Child Support Enforcement Program, Title IV-D of the Social
Services Act, was created by Congress in 1975. Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat.
2337, 2351-60 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 651 (1988)). See infra
notes 102-21 and accompanying text. The Program's purpose is the enforcement
and collection of child support. Non-AFDC mothers are provided assistance in en-
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ernment intervention in those cases occurs only at the mother's
request and initiation. The federal government has recognized, to
a certain degree, the importance of paternity adjudication. Since
1975, it has conditioned receipt of AFDC benefits upon maternal
cooperation in establishing the paternity of all nonmarital
children.33
1. History of the AFDC Program
a. Legislative History of the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children Program
The AFDC program was created in 1935 as part of the Social
Security Act.34 Originally known as Aid to Dependent Children
(ADC), the Act was intended primarily to aid widows and their
children.35 The rationale underlying the Act was that widows and
their children fell into poverty through no fault of their own, but
rather due to some cruel fate that took away their husbands and
fathers.36 They were the so-called "deserving poor."37
The current AFDC program is a federal program which pro-
vides matching funds to the states.38 Participation by the states is
voluntary, but if a state chooses to participate, it must adhere to
the regulations set forth by the federal government.39 This type of
forcing and collecting support on the theory that, without the income from the
child support, they might be forced to rely upon public assistance. Office of Child
Support Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Essentials for At-
torneys in Child Support Enforcement xx-xxi (Mark Reynolds ed. 1986) [hereinaf-
ter Essentials for Attorneys].
33. Child Support Enforcement Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88
Stat. 2337, 2351-60 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 651 (1988)). See in-
fra notes 102-21 and accompanying text.
34. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 531 (1935).
35. See William Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38
Stan. L. Rev. 1431, 1492 (1986).
36. Id.
37. Id. Women who were divorced or separated and unmarried mothers, espe-
cially unmarried black mothers, were considered inherently unworthy. This
prejudiced position neither began nor ended in 1935. The ADC program was
modeled, in many respects, after state plans to provide aid and pensions to mothers
with dependent children. A study conducted by the Children's Bureau in the early
1930s revealed that 82% of the aid given to mothers went to widows and that 96% of
all recipients were white. Ruth Sidel, Women and Children Last: The Plight of
Poor Women in Affluent America ch. 4 (1986). See also Winifred Bell, Aid to De-
pendent Children, 1-56 (1965).
38. Diann Dawson, The Evolution of a Federal Family Law Policy Under Title
IV-A of the Social Security Act-The Aid to Families with Dependent Children Pro-
gram, 36 Cath. U.L. Rev. 197, 197-98 (1986).
39. All fifty states as well as the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands, currently participate in the AFDC program. See Office of Fam-
ily Assistance, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Characteristics of State
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financing design is known as "cooperative federalism." 40 The pro-
gram's legislative history reveals that Congress did not intend
strong federal regulation and intervention.41 Rather, Congress left
the specific details of implementation and operation to the states
and left with the states the primary authority to legislate and reg-
ulate in the area of family law.42 The initial federal eligibility re-
quirement was originally set forth by the Social Security Act of
1935. The Act specified only that the child had to be deprived of
parental support or care because of death, continued absence from
the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent.43 In 1939,
Congress added the requirement that the child be "needy." Sub-
sequent federal enactments required recipients to meet this two-
pronged test of need and dependency in order to be eligible for
benefits.
The first federal intervention into the area of child support
enforcement came in 1950 with the Notification of Law Enforce-
ment Officials (NOLEO) amendment to the Social Security Act.45
This provision was directed at state welfare agencies that were
providing AFDC to children who had been abandoned or deserted
by a parent.46 NOLEO required such agencies to notify the appro-
priate law enforcement officials of the abandonment. 47
Federal efforts to enforce child support continued. In 1965,
Congress enacted a law allowing the use of Social Security records
to locate absent parents.48 This was followed by the 1967 Social
Security Amendments4 9 which required that each state establish a
single agency for the purpose of determining paternity and collect-
Plans for Aid to Families with Dependent Children Under Title IV-A of the Social
Security Act (1989 ed.).
40. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1967).
41. See Dawson, supra note 38, at 197.
42. Id. at 197-98. The enumerated powers clause in art. I, § 8, cl. 18 of the Con-
stitution, restricts congressional action to those subject areas actually specified or
enumerated in the Constitution. Those subject areas include such things as war
and defense, interstate and foreign commerce, and the postal system. U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8. Congress, however, has indirectly used its budgetary and appropriations
powers to allow federal intervention and legislation in the family law area.
43. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, ch. 531, § 406, 49 Stat. 620, 629 (1935)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 606 (1988)).
44. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 403, 53 Stat. 1360, 1380
(1939) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1982)).
45. Act of Aug. 28, 1950, ch. 809, § 321(b)(10), 64 Stat. 477, 550 (1950) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(11) (1988)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 340, 79 Stat. 286, 411 (1965) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1306 (1988)).
49. Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 211, 81 Stat. 821, 896-97 (1968) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a) (1988)).
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ing support payments from deserting parents.5 0 The 1967 amend-
ments also gave the individual states access to Internal Revenue
Service records by court order.51 These additions to the Social Se-
curity Act suggest a subtle but increasing role for the federal gov-
ernment in the family law arena. The cooperative federalism
financing scheme ensured a captive audience, and the escalating
expenditures, necessitated by the increasing numbers of needy and
dependent children, impelled federal involvement.
b. Judicial Interpretation of the Social Security Act's
Provisions Regarding Aid to Families with
Dependent Children
Several states, of their own volition, raised the standards of
eligibility for AFDC benefits.52 In essence, these states sought to
condition AFDC benefits on maternal cooperation in naming the
father of the nonmarital child and initiating a paternity suit.53 If
the mothers refused, their benefits, and/or their children's bene-
fits were subject to termination.5 4
Early case law concerning compelled maternal cooperation
indicates that it was not possible to deny benefits to an uncoopera-
tive mother because such measures added to the eligibility require-
50. Id.; 1974 U.S. Cong. Code and Admin. News 8148.
51. Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 211(b), 81 Stat. 821, 897 (1968) (re-
pealed by Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(c)(8), (f), 88 Stat. 2360, 2361
(1975)). The access to governmental records to locate absent parents is now set
forth in 42 U.S.C.A. § 653 (1988), and information may be requested from records
maintained by "any of the departments, agencies, or instrumentalities of the United
States or of any State." Id. at § 653(e).
52. These states included West Virginia, Illinois, New York, Connecticut, Ore-
gon and California.
53. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 132-a(3) (McKinney 1983) and N.Y. Comp.
Codes R. and Regs., tit. 18, § 351.2(e)(2)(iv) (1988).
The regulation read, in pertinent part:
When an applicant for or recipient of public assistance willfully... re-
fuses to cooperate by furnishing information or aid to the local child
support enforcement unit in... establishing paternity, the social serv-
ices official shall not provide ... assistance or care for such applicant
or recipient for so long as such cooperation is withheld.
Id.
54. Very few of the cases refer to the reasons given by mothers of nonmarital
children for refusing to cooperate with the government's efforts to establish the pa-
ternity of their children. According to Welfare Department personnel in Connecti-
cut in the early 1970s, the greatest deterrent is "fear of being beaten up by the
identified father[s]." Child Support and the Work Bonus: Hearings on S. 1842 and
S. 2081 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 182 (1973) [herein-
after Child Support Hearing] (statement of Elizabeth Spalding, National Task
Force on Marriage and Family Relations and Divorce, National Organization for
Women).
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ments set by Congress.55 The issue of maternal cooperation was
litigated in the late 1960s and continued into the 1970s.56 In Doe v.
Shapiro,57 the United States District Court for the District of Con-
necticut invalidated a state welfare department regulation which
terminated welfare payments to nonmarital children if the mother
refused to disclose the father's name.58 The court invalidated the
regulation because it created an additional eligibility requirement
for receipt of AFDC benefits.59 The court stated:
Under the Social Security Act, a child is eligible for and enti-
tled to AFDC assistance if he is both "needy" and "depen-
dent." A child is "needy" if he "does not have the income and
resources sufficient to assure economic security" when mea-
sured against standards of need established by the individual
states.... A child is "dependent" if a parent is continually ab-
sent from the home.... These are the only two eligibility re-
quirements which Congress has imposed .... 60
The court invalidated the Connecticut regulation because it con-
flicted with the governing federal statute. Thus, the court did not
reach the constitutional issues the plaintiffs raised. The plaintiffs
had challenged the regulation on fourteenth amendment self-in-
crimination grounds.61
The Connecticut Welfare Department amended the regula-
tion to terminate only the benefits of the mother and not those of
the child in the event the mother refused to cooperate in establish-
ing the paternity of the beneficiary child.62 This amendment also
was invalidated by the court as "[having] the same vice as the orig-
inal."63 Though the regulation was directed toward the mother,
the court recognized that the deleterious impact also would fall
upon the child.64
Similar regulations requiring maternal cooperation as a con-
dition for the receipt of public assistance were challenged in other
55. See, e.g., Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed,
396 U.S. 488, reh'g denied, 397 U.S. 970 (1970); Doe v. Swank, 332 F. Supp. 61 (N.D.
Ill.), aff'd sub. no ., Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 (1971); Doe v. Lavine, 347 F.
Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
56. It is interesting to note that it was not until the mid-1960s, with the advent
of federally funded legal aid to the poor, that the AFDC program became the sub-
ject of litigation. Barbara Sard, The Role of the Courts in Welfare Reform, in Wo-
men as Single Parents 169 (Elizabeth Mulroy ed. 1988).
57. Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969).
58. Id. at 767-68.
59. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
60. 302 F. Supp. at 764 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)).
61. Id. at 762-63.
62. See Doe v. Harder, 310 F. Supp. 302, 303 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed,
399 U.S. 902 (1970).
63. 310 F. Supp. at 303.
64. Id.
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states.65 In Doe v. Swank,6 6 the plaintiff challenged an Illinois
regulation that denied aid to a nonmarital child if the mother re-
fused to cooperate in naming the father. The regulation mandated
that, if a mother wanted public assistance for a child less than two
years of age whose paternity had not been established, the mother
was required to cooperate with the state's attorney in initiating a
paternity action on the child's behalf.6 7 If the mother refused to
cooperate, both the mother and the child were ineligible for aid.68
The plaintiff in Doe v. Swank challenged this regulatory provision,
asserting that it was "inimical to rights secured by the fifth, ninth
and fourteenth amendments."69 The court, citing the Connecticut
case Doe v. Shapiro,7O reiterated that under AFDC the eligibility
for aid requirements are met if the child is both needy and depen-
dent.71 No other prerequisite was authorized. The court in Doe v.
Swank declared the Illinois regulatory provision void on statutory
grounds and, as a result, never reached the constitutional issues
raised in the claim.72 The United States Supreme Court affirmed
the decision.7 3
65. See, e.g., Meyers v. Juras, 327 F. Supp. 759 (D. Or. 1971); Taylor v. Martin,
330 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1971), Doe v. Swank, 332 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
66. 332 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
67. Id. at 62. The Illinois Department of Public Categorical Assistance Manual
stated:
As a condition of initial or continuing eligibility the Illinois Public Aid
Code provides the parent or other person having custody of a child on
whose behalf he is applying for or receiving [public assistance] must
request the Attorney General (State's Attorney for Cook County) file
action for enforcement of such remedies as the law provides for fulfill-
ment on the support obligation of the absent parent of such child. Ab-
sent parent includes the legal parent or father of a child born out of
wedlock, whether or not his paternity has been legally established.
Illinois Department of Public Categorial Assistance Manual § 1259.1, quoted in Doe
v. Swank, 332 F. Supp. 61, 62 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
68. Id.; see 332 F. Supp. at 62.
69. Id. at 62. The fifth amendment states that "no person ... shall be com-
pelled . . . to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend V. The ninth
amendment states that "the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S.
Const. amend. IX. The fourteenth amendment states that "no State shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 2. Note that the Constitution does not expressly assert that there is
a right to privacy. This penumbral right was firmly recognized in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
70. 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969).
71. Doe v. Swank, 332 F. Supp. at 63.
72. Id.
73. Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 (1971). See also Doe v. Flowers, 364 F. Supp.
953 (N.D. W. Va. 1973), aff'd., 416 U.S. 922 (1974) (West Virginia statute that re-
quired maternal cooperation in naming the father of child born out of wedlock as a
condition for receipt of AFDC benefits declared invalid as it imposed additional eli-
gibility requirements that were contrary to the wishes of Congress).
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Several years later, in Doe v. Norton,74 the Connecticut
courts had yet another chance to consider the constitutionality of
compelling mothers to disclose the names of the putative fathers
of their nonmarital children. Women who had nonmarital chil-
dren brought a class action against the Commissioner of Welfare of
the State of Connecticut.75 The Connecticut legislature was un-
daunted by judicial thwarting of its attempts to require women to
reveal the names of the fathers of their nonmarital children 76 and
had passed another statute mandating such a disclosure. 77 This
statute made refusing to divulge the name of the father punishable
by up to one year in prison and a $200 fine.78 The plaintiffs as-
serted that the statute conflicted with the provisions of the Social
Security Act in that incarceration of an unwed mother would not
be in the best interests of the dependent child.79 They also
claimed that the statute violated their fundamental rights to due
process, equal protection, and privacy8 0 and that the classification
of unwed mothers should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.8 '
The Norton court divided the members of the class action
into two separate and distinct classes: unwed mothers and
nonmarital children.82 The court rationalized this division, saying
that "some of the interests which the mothers urge relating to the
subject matter of this action are neither typical of nor congruent
with the interests of their children, but actually conflict with them
in several respects."8 3 The court not only justified dividing the
class, but also upheld the further separation of the mothers from
the children as a result of the incarceration, declaring, "[w]hile the
incarceration of a contemptuous mother may not always be in her
child's best interest, this does not establish any irreconcilable con-
74. Doe v. Norton, 356 F. Supp. 202 (D. Conn.), op. supp. 365 F. Supp. 65 (D.
Conn. 1973), prob. juris noted, 415 U.S. 912 (1974), vacated, Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S.
391 (1975), on remand, Doe v. Maher, 414 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Conn. 1976), vacated,
Maher v. Doe, 432 U.S. 526 (1977).
75. Doe v. Norton, 356 F. Supp. 202, 203 (D. Conn. 1973).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 57-64.
77. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-440(b) (1972) (transfered to 46b-169 (1979)).
78. Id.; Doe v. Norton, 356 F. Supp. 202, 203 (D. Conn. 1973).
79. Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. at 71. Both the plaintiffs and the court took the
position that the United States Supreme Court's ruling in King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309 (1968), was the guiding principle. In King, the Supreme Court stated that, with
regard to dependent children, "[the] protection of such children is the paramount
goal of AFDC." Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. at 71 (quoting King, 342 U.S. at 325).
80. Id. at 69.
81. Id. at 78.
82. Id. at 69. The court undertook this division on its own motion. Id.
83. Id.
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flict between the two acts."8 4
In all the earlier cases, the courts had held that AFDC bene-
fits could not be denied to either a mother or her child due to the
mother's refusal to establish paternity.8 5 The court in Doe v. Nor-
ton decided otherwise. The Norton court relied, in part, on a regu-
lation adopted by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW) in 1973 which affirmed that a child may not be de-
nied benefits, but which allowed denial of benefits to the mother
or other caretaker who refused to cooperate in establishing pater-
nity.8 6 In addition, the court was not convinced that the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights had been violated.87 The court stated: "the
legal semantics in which they have dressed their particular views
about morality, propriety, and psychology do not furnish any con-
stitutional or statutory basis for striking down Connecticut's stat-
ute."88 Before the Supreme Court could hear the Norton appeal in
September of 1975,89 a new amendment was added to the Social
Security Act's provision regarding Aid to Families with Dependent
Children. This new federal amendment required maternal cooper-
ation in establishing the paternity of nonmarital children as a con-
dition for eligibility to receive AFDC.90 The United States
84. Id. at 73. The two Acts referred to are the Social Security Act and the Con-
necticut Statute. The AFDC Act begins with a statement of purpose which reads:
For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their
own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to fur-
nish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as far as
practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy dependent
children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to
help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents or
relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support
and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of contin-
uing parental care and protection ....
42 U.S.C.A § 601 (1988). The court did not detail how this purpose could be facili-
tated while the mother was incarcerated.
85. See cases cited supra note 65.
86. Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. at 72 n.8 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 223.90(b)(4) (1973)).
87. Id. at 69.
88. Id.
89. Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975) (vacating the opinion of the district
court).
90. The amendment to the Social Security Act, known as the Child Support
Amendment, stated that:
A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children
must... (26) provide that, as a condition of eligibility for aid, each ap-
plicant or recipient will be required... (B) to cooperate with the State
(i) in establishing the paternity of a child born out of wedlock with re-
spect to whom aid is claimed, and (ii) in obtaining support payments
for such applicant and for a child with respect to whom such aid is
claimed, or in obtaining any other payments or property due such ap-
plicant or such child... and that, if the relative with whom a child is
living is found to be ineligible because of failure to comply with the
requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph, any aid
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Supreme Court remanded Norton to the District Court to recon-
sider the Connecticut statute in light of the new federal
amendment.91
c. The Child Support Amendments of 1975 to the Social
Security Act and Maternal Cooperation
The Child Support Amendment of 1975 was part of the larger
Child Support Enforcement Act.92 Despite reservations about the
federal government's heavy involvement in what was traditionally
state domain, President Ford signed the bill into law on January 4,
1975.93
The Child Support Amendment was more far-reaching than
anything that the federal government had previously adopted. Ti-
tle IV-D, the part of the AFDC statute dealing with child support
and establishment of paternity,94 requires each participating state
to establish a separate agency whose sole purpose is to administer
the Child Support Enforcement Act.95 The Child Support Amend-
for which such child is eligible will be provided in the form of protec-
tive payments as described in section [606(b)(2) of this title] ....
Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(c)(5), 88 Stat. 2337,
2359-60 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 602 (1988)).
91. Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391, 393 (1975).
92. The Child Support Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337
(1975).
93. Margaret Malone, Congressional Research Service, Lib. Cong. Rep. No. 84-
796 EPW, The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 at 2 (Oct. 25, 1984)
(noting that President Ford "observed that certain provisions 'go too far by inject-
ing the Federal Government into domestic relations,'" and that there were "serious
privacy and administrative issues .... "). President Ford's reluctance is intriguing
since in 1949, as a young representative, he introduced the first legislation that
dealt with the absent parent's failure to provide support for his or her dependent
children. See 121 Cong. Rec. 26,542 (1975) (statement of Sen. Sam Nunn). His bill,
known as the "Run-Away Pappy Bill," allowed for enforcement of support orders
in the federal courts and made it a crime for persons to travel across state lines for
the purpose of avoiding support obligations. Id. See also H.R. 4580, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess., 95 Cong. Rec. 5927 (1949). Ford introduced similar bills for the next eight
years but with no success. Id. 121 Cong. Rec., supra. He introduced a child sup-
port enforcement bill as late as 1973. H.R. 2309, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 Cong. Rec.
1639 (1973). When he introduced his bill he stated:
(This bill] would make child support orders enforceable in Federal
courts. It would bring Federal authority to bear on the problem of
nonsupport by husbands and fathers who shirk their parental respon-
sibilities.
Passage of my bill will give legal sanction to the moral and social
obligations every husband has to take care of his family.
119 Cong. Rec. 1618 (1973) (statement of Rep. Ford). He clearly was in favor of leg-
islation that would provide federal power to enforce child support orders. See id.
94. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 661-666 (1980).
95. Id. at § 652. These agencies are called, appropriately enough, "IV-D agen-
cies" and are governed by certain statutory requirements set forth in the Child
Support Enforcement Act.
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ment also stipulated that any person receiving AFDC benefits
must assign to the IV-D agency all rights to support that they have
from another person.96
The Child Support Enforcement Act was born of a sentiment
among federal legislators that the individual states were not ade-
quately collecting child support payments. This inadequacy was
especially troubling in light of the 1967 amendments which al-
lowed the states great discretion and independence. 9 7 The Act's
legislative history reflects a strong, recurrent theme of perceived
fiscal crisis coupled with a breakdown in the American family.
The perception among legislators was that the welfare system was
costing the federal government more each year; that it was subject
to fraud and abuse;98 that it provided improper incentives for "im-
proper" behavior;99 and that it needed substantial modification.
The remarks of Nebraska Senator Curtis regarding AFDC, the
most suspect of all welfare programs, illustrate this perception:
This program [AFDC], the Nation's largest cash assistance pro-
gram, has grown alarmingly in recent years ....
[M]any of these are truly needy families, caught in a spi-
ral of economic difficulty and dependency through no fault of
their own.
Careful and detailed analysis of the AFDC program,
however, reveals there are many defects in the Social Security
Act itself which cause high-income people to be eligible for
welfare, which have created loopholes enabling certain individ-
uals to manipulate the system, and which permit opportunities
for fraud and laxity .... 100
The governmental interest in establishing the paternity of
nonmarital children increases as the number of children receiving
AFDC increases. In cases where paternity can be established, the
burden of support shifts from the government to the father. The
growing concern about rising AFDC expenditures is reflected in
the increasing intervention of the federal government. The series
96. Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(c)(5), 88 Stat. 2337, 2359 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(26)(A) (1988)).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
98. See 121 Cong. Rec. 7,696 (1975) (statement of Rep. Edwards from Alabama)
("AFDC is the Nation's costliest welfare program, as well as the program most sub-
ject to abuse.").
99. Legislators believed the provision of AFDC benefits actually motivated
young single women to bear children out of wedlock. See, e.g., 121 Cong. Rec.
14,394 (1975) (statement of Rep. Daniel from Virginia speaking on the need for na-
tional welfare reform) ("[AFDC] also encourages single women and unmarried
couples to have children by awarding large financial bonuses for the first child,
with lesser inducements for additional children.").
100. 121 Cong. Rec. 13,942 (1975) (statement of Sen. Curtis.)
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of amendments to the Social Security Act since its inception dem-
onstrates the decline of federalism, at least as applied to the imple-
mentation of AFDC. Concurrent with decreasing federalism is a
decline in maternal discretion. As the federal government man-
dates states' behavior and procedures, the choices available to ben-
eficiary-mothers decreases. The rationales underlying the Child
Support Amendment of 1975 manifest this decline.
The balance between the discretion to be afforded the single
mother in raising her child and the interests of the state has sel-
dom been fully considered. The issue of mandatory establishment
of paternity and maternal cooperation did arise during congres-
sional deliberation both before and after passage of the Child Sup-
port amendments.' 0 ' In 1973, Congress held hearings before the
Senate Committee on Finance to consider child support and the
work bonus.'0 2 The bill under consideration contained provisions
for mandatory establishment of paternity as a precondition for
AFDC. Natalie Heineman, president of the board of directors of
the Child Welfare League objected to this requirement. 0 3 Ms.
Heineman expressed general support for the bill, but stated that
there were several provisions that caused grave concern.O4 Re-
garding mandatory establishment of paternity and the stopping of
payments to recalcitrant mothers, she noted:
If a mother, for whatever reason, is considered not to be coop-
erating in this manner (and in some instances she may have
good reasons which may be in the child's best interest) she will
not be eligible for AFDC and the child will be deprived of
assistance. We do not believe this is sound policy.' 05
Heineman further stated that most mothers cooperate when given
notification and information regarding their rights. 0 6 Under the
provisions of the bill, mandatory establishment of paternity was
imposed only upon children receiving AFDC. In non-AFDC cases,
a mother of a nonmarital child could decide to establish paternity
if, in her judgment, it was in her or her child's best interests. Ms.
Heineman stated that before the state forces establishment of pa-
ternity for AFDC families, there should be some avenue whereby
this same discretion could be employed.10 7
Senator Curtis asked Ms. Heineman why she was "opposed to
101. See, e.g., supra note 94.
102. Child Support Hearing, supra note 54.
103. Id. at 118, 119-21 (statement of Natalie Heineman).
104. Id. at 119.




requiring fathers to support their own children?"' 0 8 She explained
that that was not her position. Later testimony from Jean Rubin,
also from the Child Welfare League, suggested that there were in-
stances in which the father is "abusive, alcoholic, mentally dis-
traught, where it would be dangerous to have the father around
. "...,109 In those instances, Ms. Rubin said, "there should be some
protection left as to whether it is in the best interest of the child to
have the father involved."11° The committee chairperson, Senator
Long, replied:
[O]ur proposal in that situation would be simply to say that we
will pay the mother welfare, but the father has to settle with
us, and we want to know who he is .... And if he wants to
wage war on somebody, let him wage war on the U.S. Govern-
ment, not on the child or on the mother. We are willing to de-
fend ourselves from alcoholic or brutal fathers, but we do
think that he ought to be made to make a contribution, and
that is why we think he ought to deal with the Government
and not the mother. She is not going to get any help from him
directly-about the most she is likely to get is a good beating
out of it, and we do not want that to happen.11 1
The legislation that ultimately passed as Title IV-D contained
the provision for mandatory establishment of paternity. Within
several months, new bills were proposed to amend the recently
amended Social Security Act.112 The House of Representatives ap-
proved legislation that retained the establishment of paternity, but
added, "unless ... it is against the best interests of the child to do
so."113 This amendment, notably, did not pass the House without
debate. One of the Representatives was quite vocal in his opposi-
tion. He thought it unfair that the United States' taxpayers were
getting "socked" because "professional welfarists [were claiming]
blanket amnesty" and refusing to cooperate in establishing pater-
nity.1" 4 He said that the provision considering the best interests of
the child appeared to be a "wide-open loophole." 1' 5 Representa-
tive Fraser, from Minnesota, supported the amendments. 116 He
noted that the HEW regulations that had been developed to imple-
ment the Child Support Enforcement Program allowed for an ex-
ception to mandatory cooperation only in instances of forcible rape
108. Id. at 122.
109. Id. at 124 (statement of Jean Rubin).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., supra note 90 and accompanying text.
113. H.R. 8598, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. 23,695, 23,696 (1975).
114. 121 Cong. Rec. 23,698 (statement of Rep. Bauman).
115. Id.
116. Id. (statement of Rep. Fraser). Donald Fraser is currently the Mayor of
Minneapolis, Minnesota.
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and incest.' 17 The HEW regulations that were eventually codified
stated that:
The IV-D agency need not attempt to establish paternity in
any case involving incest or forcible rape, or in any case in
which legal proceedings for adoption are pending, if, in the
opinion of the IV-D agency, it would not be in the best inter-
ests of the child to establish paternity.1 18
The regulations designate seven circumstances as acceptable ex-
ceptions for refusal to cooperate."19 These include when the child
is the result of rape, incest, or adoption, or where physical harm to
the child or the mother is likely to result if the mother were to
cooperate, or where there is significant risk of emotional harm to
either the child or the mother. 2o Several years after the imple-
mentation of this regulation, sixty-six percent of the exceptions
were due to the threat of physical harm to the parent or caretaker,
or to the child.121
d. Post-1975 Changes in the AFDC Program
Most of the changes to the AFDC program since 1975 have
strengthened the involvement of the federal government and in-
creased the expectations of the individual states. The driving force
behind these changes is money. Policymakers are concerned about
both the inadequate financial status of single mothers and the in-
adequate funds available to support the AFDC program.
By the early 1980s, it had become increasingly apparent that
the increase in the number of single households headed by women
meant poverty for millions of women and children. The most sig-
nificant rate of increase of single-parent households has been
among never-married mothers.122 The increase in households
headed by women who never married was 377% between 1970 and
1983.123 In 1981, approximately four million of the eight million
women who were single heads of households were entitled to re-
ceive child support payments from the fathers of their children.124
Only forty-seven percent of these women received the full amount
of child support and twenty-eight percent received nothing at
117. Id. See 45 C.F.R. § 232.43 (1990).
118. 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(b) (1990).
119. 45 C.F.R. § 232.43 (1990).
120. Id. These are known as the "good cause" exceptions. See also Ruthellen
Mulberg, AFDC: Good Cause Claims for Refusing to Cooperate in Establishing Pa-
ternity on Securing Child Support, Social Security Bulletin, May 1983, at 7.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Essentials for Attorneys, supra note 32, at xx.
124. Malone, supra note 93, at 4.
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all.' 2 5 Taxpayers ended up paying the money owed by the men
who were not supporting their children.
In 1984, Congress enacted major legislation designed to
amend the Child Support Enforcment Act126 and "bring the absent
parent back into involvement with the financial support of their
children."12 7 The 1984 amendments further enlarged the scope of
federal involvement in enforcing child support. The amendments
required mandatory income withholding,128 required the Internal
Revenue Service to withhold federal tax refunds from persons
who were in arrears in their child support payments,129 and re-
quired each state to set up expedited procedures for obtaining and
enforcing child support with the option of using these proceedings
for adjudication of paternity.' 30 The amendments also extended
the statute of limitations for establishing paternity to eighteen
years. Thus a paternity suit could be brought against a putative fa-
ther at any time up until the "child" was eighteen years of age.' 31
President Reagan commanded a study of the welfare system
in his 1986 State of the Union Address. 32 Legislators and policy-
makers soon realized that the 1984 amendments did not suffi-
ciently remedy the problems for needy children and further
amended the Child Support Enforcement Program. Senator Lloyd
Bentsen, the chairperson of the Senate Committee on Finance, in-
troduced a hearing on the reform of welfare and the Child Support
Enforcement System by saying:
At a time when the stock markets are booming and millions of
Americans are prospering, there is also a deeply troubling un-
dercurrent in our society. One-quarter of our children live
with a single parent. Twenty percent of the babies in America
are born to unwed mothers. In an ocean of prosperity, one-
fifth of our children live on barren islands of poverty. The
number of children receiving Aid to Families with Dependent
Children has more than tripled over the past generation....
We are looking for answers that will help us strengthen fami-
125. Id.
126. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98
Stat. 1305 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
127. 130 Cong. Rec. E1234 (1984) (extension of statement of Sen. Simpson).
128. Pub. L. No. 98-378, § 3(b), 98 Stat. at 1306 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(1)
(1988)).
129. Id. at § 11(d), 21(a)-(c), 98 Stat. at 1318, 1322-24, (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 664(a)(2)(A) (1988)).
130. Id. at § 3(g), 98 Stat. at 1306 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(c) (1988)).
131. Id. at § 3(b), 98 Stat. at 1306 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. 666(a)(5) (1988)).
132. Carmen Solomon, Congressional Research Service, Lib. Cong. Rep. No. 88-
702 EPW, The Family Support Act of 1988: How it Changes the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Child Support Enforcement Programs 1
(Nov. 7, 1988).
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lies, build a more stable social order, and provide elements of
opportunity for millions of Americans. 133
To alleviate the poverty of households headed by single women
and the concomitant burden their care imposes on the taxpayers,
Congress drafted the Family Support Act of 1988.134 The purpose
of the Act was to revise the AFDC program to emphasize work,
child support, and family benefits in an effort to avoid long-term
dependence on welfare.' 35 The Act also strengthened governmen-
tal involvement in establishing paternity by increasing both the
federal assistance to the states and the standard for the number of
paternities that must be established each year.13 6 The arguments
in favor of the 1988 Act were remarkably similar to the arguments
for the earlier Acts. Governor Michael Castle, Head of the Gover-
nors' Task Force on Welfare Reform, appeared before the Senate
Committee on Finance and stated:
Paternal identification is another interesting area. They say
that only 12 percent of the current AFDC recipients have been
able to identify the fathers of the children involved-or have
been willing to, or whatever it may be. Well, clearly that has
to change. I think we have to have some generally young men
in this country understand that, if they are going to be fathers,
they basically are going to have an eighteen year contract, with
the State involved in that contract, to help support the chil-
dren who are theirs.137
2. Defects of the Current Practices of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children Program
a. Maternal Cooperation and the Right to Privacy
The current practice requires maternal cooperation in estab-
lishing the paternity of nonmarital children. Advocates of this
practice argue that it serves the state's goal of minimizing its wel-
fare expenditures. The question must be: at whose expense is this
goal being met? Little inquiry has gone into the trade-offs and
detriments of this policy, even though consitutional problems are
inherent in the mandatory scheme of maternal cooperation as cur-
rently applied.
The assumption that the right to privacy is conditional is one
133. Welfare Reform: Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1987) [hereinafter Welfare Reform Hearings] (statement of
Sen. Bentsen).
134. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
135. Welfare Reform Hearings, supra note 133, at 26-27.
136. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343, 2350 (1988).
137. Welfare Reform Hearings, supra note 133, at 27.
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of the most problematic aspects of maternal cooperation. The
right to privacy was legally recognized as far back as 1765 when
the English Lord Camden wrote: "It is not the breaking of his
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the es-
sence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right
of personal security, personal liberty .... ,,138 More than 150 years
later, Supreme Court Justice Brandeis described the right to pro-
tect one's private life against governmental intrusion as "the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men."13 9
As important as the concept of privacy is, it is neither explic-
itly mentioned nor defined in the Constitution. The right to pri-
vacy, especially as related to sexuality and reproduction, has, like
many of other substantive rights, been teased out of the words of
the Constitution and molded into its present shape.
140
The Supreme Court provided the legal foundation for the
"discovery" of this right to privacy in Skinner v. Oklahoma.141
The Court in Skinner invalidated a statute that authorized the
sterilization of persons twice convicted and sentenced to prison for
certain crimes.142 The Court wrote: "[w]e are dealing here with
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race." 143
More than twenty years later, the United States Supreme
Court "discovered" the right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut.144 The statute in question in Griswold made it a crime to dis-
pense medical information and advice regarding contraception.145
The statute also made it illegal for married couples to use contra-
ceptives.146 The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional
because it violated a "relationship lying within the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees."147 As
the Court explained, "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
138. Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
139. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis J., dissenting).
140. The following discussion is not intended to be comprehensive. There is a
plethora of cases and scholarship dealing with privacy. The topic goes beyond the
scope of this article.
141. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
142. Id, at 536. The crimes were those deemed to be "felonies involving moral
turpitude ...." Id.
143. I& at 541.
144. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
145. Id. at 480. Violation of the statute was punishable by a fine and up to one
year in prison. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 485.
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penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create
zones of privacy."x48
The Court later extended this right to privacy to cover the
privacy interests of nonmarried persons in Eisenstadt v. Baird.149
The Court held that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from un-
warranted governmental intrusions into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."150
A year after Eisenstadt, the Court issued its landmark ruling
in the case of Roe v. Wade.151 Roe v. Wade held that a woman's
right to have an abortion was guaranteed by the Constitution.52
This result was based on the right of personal privacy. 153 The ma-
jority opinion began its legal analysis by noting that "[tihe Consti-
tution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy."154 It
further stated that the doctrine of privacy has constitutional roots
in the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments, as
well as in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights.155
It is not clear what effect the Court's recent holding in Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Services 156 will have on the doctrine of
privacy. The majority opinion in Webster stated that "[t]o the ex-
tent indicated in our opinion, we would modify and narrow Roe
and succeeding cases."1 5 7 The Webster decision has the potential
to cut short a woman's right to have an abortion.158 It does not ap-
pear, however, that the plurality modified the right to have an
abortion by modifying the right to privacy, as would be expected
under traditional notions of precedent and jurisprudential inter-
pretation. Justice Blackmun, in a dissent joined by Justices Bren-
148. I& at 484 (citation omitted).
149. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
150. 1I at 453 (emphasis in original).
151. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
152. Id. at 154.
153. Id. at 153. ("This right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a wo-
man's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
154. I& at 152.
155. Idr (citations omitted).
156. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
157. Id at 3058.
158. There are several mechanisms through which this decision could curtail a
woman's constitutionally guaranteed right to have an abortion. They include:
granting to the individual states the option to legislate restrictions which prevent
state employees and state facilities from performing or assisting abortions, requir-
ing viability testing after 20 weeks of gestation, eliminating the trimester distinc-
tions and holding that the state's interests can be compelling at any time.
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nan and Marshall, harshly criticized the plurality for avoiding the
issue of privacy. He wrote:
The plurality opinion is far more remarkable for the argu-
ments that it does not advance than for those that it does. The
plurality does not even mention, much less join, the true juris-
prudential debate underlying this case: whether the Constitu-
tion includes an "unenumerated" general right to privacy as
recognized in many of our decisions .... and, more specifically,
whether and to what extent such a right to privacy extends to
matters of childbearing and family life .... 159
Since the Court did not address the privacy issue, one assumes that
the privacy doctrine remains intact.160 Thus, while the Webster
decision struck a severe blow for reproductive freedom, at least in
principle, the doctrine of privacy was upheld.
The Court in Roe v. Wade stated that "only personal rights
that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty,' . . . are included in this guarantee of personal pri-
vacy."161 The questions then become: Is the right of a woman to
decide whether or not to reveal to the state the man with whom
she had sexual intercourse a protected interest? Is the right of a
woman to decide whether or not to legally establish the paternity
of her child a fundamental right? Is the right of a mother to
choose the make-up of her family implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty?
The Supreme Court, while averring to a unified philosophy of
familial protection, has been inconsistent in its decisions. 62 While
certain cases uphold the rights of families against intervention by
the government,163 others disavow the rights of families to be pro-
159. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3072 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
160. The distinction between the right to privacy and the right to an abortion be-
comes blurred in practice. The Court holds that the decision of whether or not to
bear a child is a private one that a woman and her physician can make. Once she
makes that decision, however, the Court indicates that the states can do whatever
they wish to impede her from acting on her decision. The end result, for the wo-
man, is the same as if the Court had held that she could not make the decision.
161. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152 (citation omitted) (quoting Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
162. For an insightful and thorough analysis of the Supreme Court and the fam-
ily, see Martha Minow, We, the Family: Constitutional Rights and American Fam-
ilies, in The Constitution and American Life 299 (David Thelen ed. 1988).
163. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (constitutional
protections granted to "non-traditional" extended families); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (rights of Amish parents to educate their own children); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (antimiscegenation statute struck down as violative of
right to choose whom to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right
of married couples to buy contraceptives); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (right of parents to send children to a private school of parents' choice);
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tected against governmental intervention and intrusion.164 The
Court has "recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters
of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [and the
Court has] consistently acknowledged a private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter."1 6 5 Taken as a whole, the cases
indicate that there are certain familial interests and familial
choices that the Court will protect.
"Family," as a descriptive term, is nebulous and undoubtedly
means different things to different people at different times. Nor-
matively, "family" refers to a man and a woman, married to each
other, and their children-the American nuclear family. However,
as anyone familiar with the realities of American life can attest,
this has never been the only form of family that exists. Increas-
ingly, families consist of parents with adopted children, stepchil-
dren and surrogate children; of divorced and separated parents and
their children; of childless couples; and of homosexual couples
with children from previous marriages or conceived via artificial
insemination. 66 The United States Census Bureau defines a fam-
ily as "two or more persons related by birth, marriage or adoption
who reside in the same household."167 The Court of Appeals of
New York recently held that the term "family" encompasses ho-
mosexual life partners and not just those related by blood or the
law.168 As Gloria Steinem states, "[flamily is content, not
form."169
Whether an unmarried woman and her child will be afforded
protection as a "family" will, of course, ultimately be determined
by the courts. In light of present census figures, only the most pa-
triarchal and paternalistic courts could find that twenty-five per-
cent of all children being born are not being born and raised in
families. For most of these children, Mom is family.
The requirement that a mother who needs AFDC benefits
must reveal the man with whom she had sexual intercourse vio-
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right of parents to choose to educate chil-
dren in non-English language).
164. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (parental freedom lim-
ited by state's parens patriae authority).
165. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 499 (1977) (citations omitted).
166. See Jerrold Footlick, What Happened to the Family? Newsweek Special
Edition, Winter/Spring 1990, at 15 (special edition on the twenty-first century fam-
ily) [hereinafter Newsweek Special Edition].
167. Id. at 18.
168. Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784
(1989) (construing the term "family" as applied to the state's rent-control laws).
169. Newsweek Special Edition, supra note 166, at 11.
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lates her fundamental rights to privacy and familial autonomy.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that a right to privacy is
implicit in the guarantees of the Constitution. 17 0 The right to pri-
vacy protects a variety of interests relating to sexuality, procrea-
tion and the rearing of children. This protection should extend to
the right of a woman to choose the design of her family.171
b. Maternal Cooperation and the Right to Equal
Protection
Requiring maternal cooperation in paternity actions as a con-
dition for receiving AFDC benefits is further tarnished because it
violates the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.172
The states are guilty of grossly unequal treatment when they re-
quire only those women who need AFDC to relinquish their con-
stitutionally protected rights. Though the practice of exchanging
constitutional rights for governmental largesse is somewhat con-
doned by the Supreme Court, it is nonetheless reprehensible. 173
The modern welfare state is markedly different from the
state envisioned by the framers of the Constitution. Today the
range of government programs, practices and benefits extends to
virtually every citizen in the country and to many aspects of life.
Our notions of the essence of benefits have grown and changed as
the population of beneficiaries has grown and changed. Govern-
mental largesse is no longer viewed as a charitable, gratuitous act
of giving.174 Rather, it is seen as the responsibility of the govern-
ment and the entitlement of the recipient.175 The significance of
this reinterpretation is that recognition of public assistance as an
170. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and cases cited supra note 163.
171. The right to privacy extends to interests beyond those mentioned here. For
instance, there is a substantial body of law revolving around the privacy protections
that the fourth amendment grants to persons involved in criminal proceedings. See,
e.g., Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
172. The fourteenth amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
173. See infra notes 175-76 and 199-211 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) ("It may be realistic
today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity'."); see
also Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964).
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entitlement includes the recognition that these benefits must be
administered under the rubrics of due process and equal
protection.176
The first question that must be addressed under an equal pro-
tection analysis is whether or not the act in question classifies per-
sons.177 Requiring maternal cooperation in the initiation of
paternity suits as a condition of receiving AFDC benefits creates
two classes: never-married single mothers and married or once-
married mothers. 7 8
If a classification exists, the second part of equal protection
analysis involves determining whether or not the classification is
applied to a suspect class,179 and/or whether the classification lim-
its the ability of persons within that classification to exercise a
fundamental right.'8 0 The Supreme Court has defined classifica-
tions based on race, alienage, and national origin as suspect.' 8 '
The Court does not consider gender and wealth-based classifica-
tions suspect, but rather quasi-suspect.'8 2 Accordingly, these gen-
der and wealth-based classifications are not subject to strict
scrutiny, but rather to intermediate and rational-basis scrutiny. 8 3
While government distinctions between unmarried mothers do not
involve a traditional suspect class,i84 they do involve the ability to
exercise fundamental rights---the right to privacy and familial au-
176. The Court has never said that there is an absolute right to welfare benefits.
Rather, once a governmental unit decides to provide assistance, the Constitution
mandates that the benefits be distributed in accordance with constitutional protec-
tions. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
177. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
178. The Child Support Enforcement Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88
Stat. 2337, 2351-60 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 651 (1988)), may create a
classification between unmarried mothers who need AFDC and unmarried mothers
who do not need AFDC. See also infra note 184.
179. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).




183. Id. The strict scrutiny standard of review was set forth in United States v.
Carolene Product Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
155 (1973) ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held
that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state in-
terest,'.., and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only
the legitimate state interests at stake.") (citations omitted). The intermediate level
of review falls in between the strict scrutiny and rational relationship tests. See
Nowak, Rotunda & Young, supra note 180, at 531.
184. An argument can be made that this classification does have a disparate im-
pact on women of color though on its face, the regulation is race-neutral. The clas-
sification has a disparate impact because black and Hispanic women who are single
parent heads of households are more likely to be living in poverty than white wo-
men. Sixty percent of families headed by black or Hispanic women are in poverty
Law and Inequality
tonomy l8 5 Because the classification burdens fundamental rights,
it should be subject to heightened scrutiny.
That the classification restricts the exercise of a fundamental
right, however, is not, in and of itself, a sufficient basis for invali-
dating the classification. If the state can show that the classifica-
tion serves an overriding or compelling governmental interest, it
will be upheld.186 Here, the classification could serve two conceiv-
able state interests: 1) the state's interest in conserving fiscal re-
sources, and 2) the state's interest, as parens patriae, in the best
interests of nonmarital children.
i. The State's Interest in Preserving Fiscal Resources
The state's interest in the state treasury is not insignificant.
Virtually every mention of welfare reform is coupled with a state-
ment about the need to constrict the flow of money from the state
coffers to welfare recipients.I8 7 In 1948, 25 out of every 1000 chil-
dren were receiving AFDC benefits.' 8 8 In 1973, this number had
increased almost five times with 113 out of every 1000 children re-
ceiving benefits under AFDC.189 Eligibility qualification had
shifted from parental death to parental absence, either because of
divorce or, increasingly, because there had not been a marriage. A
1973 estimate of the governmental savings as a result of establish-
ing paternity and support orders was forty million dollars per
week.19o Taking into consideration the expected rate of collection,
the amount is still twenty-eight million dollars per week.191 This
amount would be significantly larger if calculated with present
user and collection rates.192
as compared to 39% of white women heading single parent households. Census Re-
port, supra note 7, at 24.
Obviously the poorer the family, the greater the need for AFDC. Approxi-
mately 40% of all AFDC families are black and another 15% are Hispanic families.
White families comprised just 40% of all families on AFDC. U.S. Dep't of Health
and Human Services, Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of AFDC Recipi-
ents 1 (1987). Two classes result: one class of predominantly white women who do
not need to apply for AFDC and another comprised predominantly of black and
Hispanic women who must apply.
185. See supra notes 139-71 and accompanying text.
186. This is the strict scrutiny standard of review. See supra note 183.
187. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
188. Essentials for Attorneys, supra note 32, at xxii.
189. Id.
190. See Poulin, supra note 20, at 922.
191. Id.
192. Although the potential amount to be collected from the previously non-pay-
ing parents would be significant, it is important to note that the government is
much more successful in collecting payments for non-welfare cases than for AFDC
cases.
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The governmental potential for saving is coupled with its ill-
disguised distaste for AFDC. 193 The program and its participants
are maligned and criticized incessantly. The recipients are treated
with suspicion, disdain and outright hostility.J94 Yet, the level of
benefits is inadequate to provide support at even the level of pov-
erty. In fact, only one state in the entire country provides benefits
above the poverty level.19i The level of benefits, in real dollars,
has declined steadily for the past twenty years. In 1960, the maxi-
mum AFDC grant of the median state provided sixty-three per-
cent of the poverty level; by 1985 the maximum grant in the
median state had dropped to forty-three percent of the poverty
level.196
Though the state may have an interest in preserving its fiscal
resources, the Supreme Court, in Shapiro v. Thompson,197 has
held that the "saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise
invidious classification."' 9 8 Mandating the establishment of pater-
nity for all nonmarital children receiving AFDC may save the gov-
ernment money. It does so, however, only by invidiously invading
the constitutional rights of poor women. AFDC is not a gift. It is
something to which poor women and children are entitled. The
Shapiro rationale would protect rights of non-married mothers ap-
plying for AFDC. However, Shapiro has been weakened by subse-
quent cases, such as Dandridge v. Williams.199 According to the
dissent, the majority opinion represents "the Court's emasculation
of the Equal Protection Clause as a constitutional principle appli-
cable to the area of social welfare administration."20 0 The Court in
193. See generally Harrington, supra note 10 (reassessing the state of poverty in
the nation with the view that changes in government policies have eroded the anti-
poverty campaign of the 1960s).
194. I& at 26-29.
195. That state is Alaska. Sidel, supra note 37, at 85.
196. Id at 87 (based on figures for a family of four).
197. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
198. Id. at 633. In Shapiro, the Court held that a one-year residency require-
ment for receipt of AFDC benefits was unconstitutional. Id. at 627. Justice Bren-
nan, the author of the opinion, wrote:
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal
integrity of its programs. It may legitimately attempt to limit its ex-
penditures, whether for public assistance, public education, or any
other program. But a State may not accomplish such a purpose by in-
vidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. It could not, for ex-
ample, reduce expenditures for education by barring indigent children
from its schools. Similarly, in the cases before us, appellants must do
more than show that denying welfare benefits to new residents saves
money.
Id. at 633.
199. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
200. Id at 508. (Marshall, J. with Brennan, J. dissenting).
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Dandridge upheld a Maryland statute that imposed a ceiling on
the maximum grant allowable, regardless of family size and
need. 201 The Court imposed only a rational relationship/reason-
able basis test,202 but noted that if this case had involved a free-
dom guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, the result might have been
different. 203
The Court further muddied the precedents set in Goldberg v.
Kelly 204 and Shapiro v. Thompson 205 in the 1971 case of Wyman
v. James.206 In Wyman, a welfare recipient refused to allow a so-
cial worker to visit her home and, subsequently, her benefits were
terminated. 207 The Wyman Court upheld a provision of New
York's AFDC regulations requiring home visits by a caseworker as
a condition for continued eligibility.208 The majority found that
the home visit was not a fourth amendment "search" and, there-
fore, there was no constitutional violation.209
Justice Douglas' dissent perceived the "central question [as]
whether the government by force of its largesse has the power to
'buy up' rights guaranteed by the Constitution. But for the asser-
tion of her constitutional right, [the AFDC recipient] ... would
have received the welfare benefit."2 1o Justices Marshall and Bren-
nan, in a separate dissent, objected to the majority opinion's im-
plicit holding that a welfare recipient waives her right to
constitutional protection by accepting welfare benefits.21 '
No decision dealing with welfare rights is entirely on point
with respect to the relationship between the state's fiscal interests
and the requirement of maternal cooperation in paternity proceed-
ings. If the Court recognized the fundamental privacy rights in-
herent in the paternity issue, it would reiterate its holding in
Shapiro v. Thompson.212 A decision consistent with Shapiro
would hold that a state's interest in conserving money cannot over-
201. Id. at 486-87.
202. Id. at 485-87.
203. Id. at 484.
204. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
205. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
206. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
207. Id. at 313-14.
208. Id. at 326.
209. Id. at 316-18. The Court stated, assuming arguendo that the home visit were
a search, it was "reasonable" and, hence, not a violation of the fourth amendment.
Id. at 318. One observer of Wyman has written: '"his reasoning seems again to
suggest that governmental involvement in the welfare recipient's financial exist-
ence justifies governmental participation in other aspects of the recipient's life."
Poulin, supra note 20, at 929-30.
210. 400 U.S. at 328 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
211. Id. at 338 (Marshall, J. and Brennan, J., dissenting).
212. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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ride a woman's constitutionally protected rights of privacy and fa-
milial autonomy. Similarly, an analysis of the economics behind
the paternity requirement would show that it meets neither the
strict scrutiny standard nor the intermediate level of review. The
purpose of requiring maternal cooperation is to establish the pater-
nity of the nonmarital child so that a support order can issue re-
lieving the state of its burden of payment. Since no evidence is
produced that the man who is ultimately adjudged the father has
either the resources213 or the inclination to pay support,2 14 the pa-
ternity requirement is overinclusive and violates the equal protec-
tion clause.
The state's budgetary concerns are not unimportant, but the
constitutional rights of women cannot be ransomed as payment for
much-needed benefits. Money may make the world go round but
it makes a poor motivator for social welfare programs. In a recent
interview, Pulitzer prize winner Toni Morrison identified the
problem:
I don't think a female running a house is a problem, a broken
family. It's perceived as one because of the notion that a head
is a man.
Two parents can't raise a child any more than one. You
need a whole community-everybody-to raise a child. The
notion that the head is the one who brings in the most money
is a patriarchal notion, that a woman--and I have raised two
children, alone-is somehow lesser than a male head. Or that
I am incomplete without the male. This is not true.
... But we [society] don't want to pay for it.
I don't think anybody cares about unwed mothers unless
they're black--or poor. The question is not about morality, the
question is money. That's what we're upset about. We don't
care whether they have babies or not.215
ii. Protecting the Best Interests of Children
The requirement of maternal cooperation in paternity pro-
213. It is more than likely that the fathers of nonmarital children whose
mothers are seeking and eligible for AFDC are not men in the higher socioeco-
nomic classes, but rather men who are in the lower socioeconomic classes. The un-
derage, underemployed, and unemployed are probably disproportionately
represented in this group of fathers. Indeed, if the putative father were a high in-
come earner (the kind that would behoove the state to adjudicate as the father) it
would make more sense for the mother to attempt to obtain support from him
rather than to go through the dehumanizing process of AFDC.
214. Granted, mechanisms for enforcing support orders are improving, see supra
notes 23-25 and accompanying text, but the reality is that most fathers do not pay
support. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
215. Bonnie Angelo, Time, May 22, 1989, at 122.
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ceedings is underinclusive as applied to the state's interest in pro-
moting the best interests of nonmarital children. If the state were
truly committed to the best interests of children, it would adopt
and implement policies that increased the numbers of children for
whom paternity is established out of the whole population of
nonmarital children-not merely the population who apply for
AFDC.216
The rationales a state adopts to bind men to AFDC women
and their children are inherently sexist, patronizing, and objec-
tionable. There is considerable evidence regarding the benefits
that accrue to children who have had their paternity estab-
lished.217 During the debates on the Child Support Enforcement
Act of 1975, attention focused on the advantages that flow from pa-
ternal involvement in the lives of young children. According to
one senator:
In the studies on delinquency and crime, it is found that the
presence of father is vital to the mental health of youngsters.
It maintains a crucial part of the socialization of children in
that they learn to accept restraints on their behavior, and it is
the father that is most likely to impose those restraints.
In early years, male and female children tend to develop
dependency on [the] mother. Later, the father is better quali-
fied than the mother to pry them loose from this dependency
... 218
When arguments of this nature are used to support the state's
compelling interest, they lose much of their persuasiveness. Regu-
lations predicated on the assumptions of the glory of the father
within a nuclear family are outdated and fail to consider the reali-
ties of life in the United States today. The enforced nuclear family
is foreign to many Native American cultures as well as to some Af-
rican Americans living in urban areas. What worked for Ozzie and
Harriet and Ward and June in the 1950s will not work in the
1990s.
If there is a compelling state interest in having fathers in-
volved with children, the state's compelling goal should be to pro-
mote adjudicating the paternity of all nonmarital children. Yet,
the bulk of the state's efforts are focused on establishing paternity
only for children receiving AFDC. Though other mothers of
nonmarital children may receive assistance from the county dis-
trict attorney's office or office of child support enforcement, it
often is only at their initiative and if the county has the resources
216. See infra notes 225-53 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 21, 23-25 and accompanying text.
218. 120 Cong. Rec. 1,745 (1974) (inserted by Sen. Thurmond).
[Vol. 8:567
1990] SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 597
to do so. Since only thirty percent of nonmarital children have
their paternity adjudicated under the present system,2 1 9 many
children are living with less than what they should have. Finally,
there are less onerous ways of establishing paternity than threat-
ening loss of welfare benefits.220 For all of the above reasons, re-
quiring maternal cooperation in paternity proceedings as a
condition for receipt of AFDC benefits is patently
unconstitutional.
It is germane at this point to consider two points that become
obvious from this discussion. The first is that this normative con-
stitutional analysis is inappropriate. As one constitutional scholar
has pointed out, substantive strategies are "covertly value-
laden."22 ' Allowing the courts to determine which rights are fun-
damental and which are not is particularly dangerous. It is espe-
cially dangerous when the rights at issue are those of women,
minorities, and poor persons, all groups whose political power is
tenuous.222 The traditionally white male and upper class Supreme
Court Justices have had a notoriously difficult time empathizing
with the lives of others not similarly situated.223
The second point is that even assuming, arguendo, that the
requirement of maternal cooperation is constitutional, it does not
syllogistically follow that it is a good policy. The purposes of
AFDC are to provide aid to the mother and child so that the
mother can raise the child.224 Parenting is hard work. It is espe-
cially difficult when resources as elementary as money are scarce.
The present system makes it even more difficult. These policies
say to the mother, from the start of her mothering career, "We
don't trust your judgment, you clearly don't know what is best for
219. See supra text accompanying note 14.
220. See infra notes 254-59 and notes 262-70 and accompanying text.
221. Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradic-
tions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J. 1063, 1065 (1981).
222. The Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), for example, illuminates the precariousness of the situation.
223. See e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (upholding the federally
enacted Hyde Amendment which severely restricted the use of Medicaid funding
for abortion. The Court in a 5-4 decision stated: "[t]he financial constraints that re-
strict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access
to abortions, but rather of her indigency."); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496
n.20 (1974) (in upholding a state health insurance program that did not cover preg-
nancy, the Court stated: "[t]he California insurance program does not exclude any-
one from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical
condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities. While it is true
that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative clas-
sification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification .....
224. See supra note 84.
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you and your child." The best programs for providing assistance to
mothers are those that provide more than just money, including:
individual programs that inspire confidence in the mother's ability
to be a good parent, programs that empower mothers, programs
that say to the mothers, "We trust you to raise this child."
B. Model II: Universal Intervention
"Speak, woman!" said another voice, coldly and sternly, pro-
ceeding from the crowd about the scaffold. "Speak; and give
your child a father!"225
The preceeding analysis demonstrates that the current prac-
tice of requiring maternal cooperation as a prerequisite to the re-
ceipt of AFDC benefits is replete with constitutional violations.
The practice creates two categories of persons: those whose consti-
tutional rights remain intact and those who must sacrifice their
rights to provide for the basic needs of their children. A system
that does not categorize persons but rather is universally applied
to all mothers who give birth to nonmarital children is an obvious,
equitable alternative. Such a system would eliminate the division
and discrimination against mothers who require public assistance.
This model, by design and necessity, would involve a high level of
governmental intervention into the lives of families. In this
model, adjudicating the paternity of all nonmarital children is ac-
tively pursued by the state and supporting mechanisms are set up
for enforcement. This approach would make adjudicating pater-
nity the norm; all mothers would establish the paternity of their
children, much like all drivers must get a driver's license. The
governmental intervention could take many different forms, but
would most probably begin as soon as possible after the birth of
the nonmarital child. For instance, government workers226 would
be stationed in hospitals and begin paternity proceedings immedi-
ately following the birth. With this approach, the government's
goal of establishing paternity for all nonmarital children would su-
persede the wishes of the mother. The increasing accuracy of tests
used to establish paternity makes the universal adjudication of pa-
ternity for all nonmarital children much more of a possibility than
has ever been entertained by policymakers.
1. The Advantages of Universal Intervention
This model is arguably the most closely aligned with the
225. Hawthorne, supra note 1, at 54 (directed to Hester Prynne).
226. These workers could be social workers, persons from the Office of Child
Support Enforcement or county attorneys.
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child's best interests, especially his or her financial interests.
While it is not in all children's interest to have their paternity ad-
judicated,2 21 it is in the best interests of most children. The as-
sumption that establishing paternity is in the best interests of
nonmarital children would become a rebuttable presumption, 228
rather than an exception.22 9 Universal adjudication of paternity
would further benefit the nonmarital child by increasing the
equality, or sense of sameness, between nonmarital children and
marital children.230
This model of universal intervention is appealing because it
does not discriminate against mothers of nonmarital children on
the basis of their need to receive AFDC benefits. Since the consti-
tutional infringements231 are applied evenly to all mothers, the
state's compelling interest argument becomes more palatable. Ac-
cordingly, the possible equal protection challenges are weakened
considerably and the policy stands on a more certain foundation.
The policy message that universal adjudication of paternity
communicates to fathers and families is a positive one. The im-
plicit message of paternal duty should make it more difficult for
fathers to evade their responsibilities to their children. The policy
message that all fathers have an inescapable responsibility for
their children applies to all children, not just those born to single
mothers. Potentially positive ramifications would be that avoid-
ance of child support payments becomes less acceptable and pater-
nal involvement with children increases. 232 Furthermore, if both
men and women were cognizant of their unavoidable duties to-
ward potential offspring, perhaps they would be more careful
when making the decision to become parents in the first place.
227. See supra notes 54, 109-11 and accompanying text.
228. The presumption that paternity adjudication was in the child's best interests
would be rebuttable only in extreme circumstances such as rape and incest.
229. The current practices surrounding adjudication of paternity, discussed
above, operate more as an exception than the rule with only approximately 30% of
all nonmarital children having their paternity legally established. See supra note
14 and accompanying text.
230. Much progress has been made toward this end in the United States over the
past two decades. Statutory changes and common law decisions have eradicated
much of the overt discrimination against "illegitimates" that was quite common in
the recent past. See, e.g., Harry Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy (1971);
Comment, Equal Protection for Illegitimates: A Consistent Rule Emerges, 1980
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 142 (authored by Scott Isaacson).
231. The constitutional right to privacy discussed supra notes 138-71 and accom-
panying text also is invaded in this model.
232. This clearly is the trend at present. Evidence of this trend includes the phe-
nomena of automatic income withholding, retention of tax returns for delinquent
support payments, and paternal leave.
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This could be especially important for minors. 23 3
Finally, universal adjudication of paternity is conceivably in
the best interests of the state in that the state is relieved, to a cer-
tain degree, of some of the burden of supporting and caring for mi-
nor children. The burden will not be completely eliminated,
however, since there are fathers who are unable to contribute to
the support of their families.234 Expenses associated with the in-
creased costs of establishing paternity and enforcing compliance
with child support orders may also reduce the savings to the state.
2. The Disadvantages of Universal Intervention
For all of its benefits, the universal intervention model is not
completely free of constitutional violations. Although the viola-
tions are not as pronounced as in the current system, universal es-
tablishment of paternity actually increases, not decreases, the
violations of the rights to privacy and familial autonomy. As dis-
cussed, these rights are not absolute 23 5 and can be co-opted in the
event of a compelling state interest. Yet, when the state is not di-
rectly supporting the nonmarital child and is unlikely to assume
that obligation, the interests of the state do not rise to the level of
compelling interests. The possibility of future welfare expenditure
is not a sufficient justification to condone routine invasions into
the lives of single women and their children. This argument
brings one back full circle toward the compulsory determination of
the paternity of children who are receiving public assistance.
Again, however, the result is violation of equal protection under
the fourteenth amendment.2 38 Furthermore, it is likely that the
procedures developed for universal adjudication of paternity will
not be universally applied.2 37 Unequal treatment, though less ap-
parent, will nonetheless still be practiced.
The universal adjudication of paternity, without regard for
233. The argument is not being made that the best solution to the increasing
numbers of nonmarital children is to convince unmarried persons not to have chil-
dren. This perspective is parochial, paternalistic, and hopelessly outdated. The re-
ality is that single women will continue to give birth to children and that there is
an increasingly important need for policies to protect the interests of all of those
involved. With this caveat in mind, it can still be said that deterring unmarried mi-
nors from becoming parents is a good idea.
234. These fathers would include those who are unemployed, underemployed,
disabled, or incarcerated.
235. See supra text accompanying note 186.
236. See supra notes 172-215 and accompanying text.
237. See irnfra notes 246-52 and accompanying text for a discussion and analysis
of legislation enacted in Wisconsin. The Wisconsin legislation was designed and in-
tended to adjudicate the paternity of all nonmarital children, but is, in fact, creating
a two-tiered system based on receipt of public assistance.
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the wishes of the mother, tends to place the mother and the child
in an adversarial relationship in which the interests of the mother
are pitted against the interests of the child.238 Our standard model
of conflict resolution is based on this adversarial model in which
the winner takes all. This confrontation may be appropriate in a
tort action or a criminal trial, but it is implicitly flawed when ap-
plied to families. Families must work together, not against each
other. An adversarial system predisposes resolution of conflicts
between mother and child to less than satisfactory results.
This battle of conflicting and competing rights is recognizable
in many other legal conflicts between mother and child and the re-
sults are equally disturbing. Too often, the result is maternal sub-
rogation to her fetus and/or child. This maternal subrogation is
illustrated in the framing of the current abortion debate. The de-
bate has moved away from arguments based on the maternal right
to privacy of Roe v. Wade,23 9 and toward arguments that empha-
size fetal rights, as in Webster.240 This maternal subrogation ulti-
mately relegates women to incubator or baby-machine status. It
can be further witnessed in the so-called "cocaine baby" arguments
and legislation,241 court-ordered caesarean section deliveries,242 fe-
tal surgery and blood transfusions, 243 and the elimination of em-
ployment choices for women because of their biological ability to
bear children.24 4
Universal establishment of paternity is additionally trouble-
some in that it is inflexible and assuming. It limits lifestyle
choices and allows for the creation of inappropriate and even dan-
gerous unions, 245 rather than clarifying and providing a helpful
and fluid framework for the modern family. Compulsory estab-
lishment of paternity imposes upon lesbian mothers and co-parents
238. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
239. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
240. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
241. See, e.g., In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio Ct. App.
1986); Judith Johnson, Minnesota's "'rack Baby" Law: Weapon of War or Link in
a Chain?, 8 Law & Inequality 485 (1990); Note, Unborn Child: Can You Be Pro-
tected?, 22 U. Rich. L. Rev. 285 (1988) (authored by Heather White); Note, Maternal
Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse",
101 Harv. L. Rev. 994 (1988).
242. See, e.g., In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987); Janet Gallagher, Prenatal In-
vasions & Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 Harv. Women's L.J. 9
(1987). See also Johnson, supra note 241, at 503-08.
243. See, e.g., Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985), va-
cated, 306 Md. 566, 510 A.2d 562 (1986).
244. See, e.g., International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricul-
tural Implement Workers of America v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th
Cir. 1989), cert granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
245. See supra note 54.
1990]
Law and Inequality
a heterosexual model of the family. A host of problems arises
within the context of artificial insemination. If universal establish-
ment of paternity is the rule, where does that leave the child con-
ceived via this method? Does the donor have an irrefutable right
to anonymity? Once exceptions are created, it will be difficult, if
not impossible, to draw the line.
The rationale behind the policy of forcing adjudication of pa-
ternity in all instances is itself suspect. It is paternalistic. It as-
sumes that a woman and her children are incomplete as a family
and that a single mother is incapable of raising children without
extreme forms of governmental intervention. Moreover, the pol-
icy fails to take into consideration the fact that some "families"
should not be formed; for example, families should not be formed
when children are the result of rape, incest, physical or emotional
abuse, or when there is evidence of chemical dependency, a com-
plete absence of judgment (i.e. putative father is a serial mur-
derer), and a variety of other imaginable situations. Should a
"family" be created between a prostitute, her child and her cus-
tomer? The benefits to the child are minimal at best and, more
likely than not, the relationship would be destructive for the child.
3. One State's Attempt at Universal Adjudication of
Paternity
The above discussion is relevant to Wisconsin's newly imple-
mented policy of establishing paternity.246 Wisconsin has adopted
pioneering child support legislation that goes beyond anything that
the federal government has yet attempted. The legislation in-
cludes certain provisions relating to the establishment of paternity.
One provision states:
The attorney designated ... shall commence an action under
this section on behalf of the state within 6 months after receiv-
ing notification... that no father is named on the birth certifi-
cate of a child who is a resident of the county if paternity has
not been adjudicated .... 247
The revolutionary element of this law is that it requires the state
to initiate paternity suits to establish the paternity of all children
born out of wedlock, regardless of receipt of public assistance.
Representative Tom Loftus, author of the legislation, stated that
the law "has as its foundation that every child born in Wisconsin
has a legal right to a father."248 He added that: "[c]hildren with-
246. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.45 (West Supp. 1989).
247. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.45 (6m) (West Supp. 1987).
248. Address by Representative Tom Loftus before the National Child Support
Enforcement Association (Aug. 22, 1988).
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out legal fathers have started down a slippery slope that leads to
poverty. Our new paternity law is a radical departure in that the
interests of the child will become equal, if not paramount, to the
interests of the natural parents."249
Maternal subrogation is an improper basis for family policy.
The Wisconsin legislation is additionally disturbing because it runs
afoul of the equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth amend-
ment.250 The legislation is being interpreted by district attorneys
to initiate only suits only on behalf of children whose mothers are
receiving AFDC. The state is in the process of compiling a list of
all children without a father's name on their birth certificates.
These lists are to be sent to the appropriate district attorneys who
will, in turn, notify the mothers that they can use the services of
the office to establish the paternity for their nonmarital chil-
dren.25 1 The state will not initiate a paternity action if the mother
does not contact the office. When an attorney working with the
program was asked if she would initiate actions for nonmarital
children who were not receiving public assistance in the event the
mother did not desire such an action, the attorney responded, "Oh
no, that would be too onerous of an invasion."252 The implication
is that it is an onerous invasion of the privacy rights of mothers
who do not need AFDC. However, if a mother requires state
assistance to provide for her children, it is expected, and accepted,
that her privacy rights are conditional and not entitled to constitu-
tional protection. This is convincing evidence that the universal
model of paternity adjudication is constitutionally infirm.
The theoretical state interests become less compelling when
the state is under no obligation for support. The supposition is
that each woman and child, without a man, represent potential
state liabilities, thus justifying the intrusion. The circumstances
have been presented in such a way that they lend themselves to
this result. The argument, as it has been framed, puts mothers at
odds with their children, rather than encouraging mothers to do
what is best for their families. This is partly due to a reluctance
to view a single mother and child(ren) as a family. Without a le-
gally established relationship involving a man, they are perceived
as incomplete. Additionally, the mothers of nonmarital children
are assumed to be selfish and unable to comprehend the benefits
249. Id. (emphasis added).
250. See supra notes 172-214 and accompanying text.
251. This notification had not yet been drafted when the author last spoke with
the administrators of the program in Wisconsin. Telephone interview with an ad-




that can accrue to a child for whom paternity is established.253
The policies result in top-down mandates of expected behavior.
They fail to empower mothers to make choices that foster their
autonomy and self-respect.
Many legislators express concern, even outrage, that so many
of the nation's children are living a life of poverty which necessi-
tates public assistance. They are even more outraged by the fact
that the government must pay for and support these impoverished
children. Their indignation about this imposed fiscal responsibility
impels them toward the current policies and practices and serves
to rationalize any type of intervention. As the budget deficit grows
and federal assistance to the states dwindles, an argument for fis-
cal conservativism, even fiscal radicalism, becomes easier for
policymakers to justify and for the people to accept. The inquiry
must continue to focus on whether or not "money" is an appropri-
ate foundation upon which to base national policies and definitions
of fundamental rights.
C. Model III: Minimal Intervention
"I will not speak!" answered Hester, turning pale as death ....
"And my child must seek a heavenly Father; she shall never
know an earthly one!" 254
Women declined to reveal the fathers of their children long
before Hester Prynne chose to keep secret the identity of the Rev-
erend Mr. Dimmesdale.255 Since the methods of determining pa-
ternity discussed earlier are riddled with constitutional violations,
it is worthwhile to consider another approach. This final approach
involves a minimum of governmental intervention and emphasizes
the autonomy of the mother. It is a libertarian perspective. The
single mother would make the decision as to whether or not she
wants to have the father of her child legally established. The ulti-
mate control of both the composition and the direction of the fam-
ily would rest with the mother. Welfare benefits would be granted
to those who show need. The "good cause" exceptions256 would be
very liberally construed and granted in the event that the mother
did not want to go ahead with the action.
253. An equally unflattering picture seems to have been painted of the fathers of
the nonmarital child. The assumption that men who father children outside of
marriage are notorious responsibility dodgers is far more prevalent than any con-
sideration of the economic realities of many young fathers.
254. Hawthorne, supra note 1, at 54 (Hester Prynne in response to the public in-
quiry as to her child's father).
255. Id.
256. See supra note 119-21 and accompanying text.
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1. The Advantages of the Libertarian Model
The libertarian model has several distinct advantages. The
most significant advantage is that the constitutional rights to pri-
vacy, family autonomy, and equal protection are sustained. This is
a marked improvement over both the current practice and the uni-
versal approach detailed above. The libertarian approach is more
in accord with American distaste for governmental intervention
and invasion and the sanctity of the individual.
The libertarian approach also has the advantage of empower-
ing the mothers of nonmarital children. The state's trust and reli-
ance on the mother's judgment has the potential to infuse her with
a sense of power and a belief that she is capable of raising the
child. This empowerment is one of the strongest features of this
option. Rather than discounting the mother, libertarianism en-
trusts her with the upbringing and care of the child. This is partic-
ularly important for welfare mothers, who are generally regarded
with suspicion.257 They are assumed to be fraudulent and incapa-
ble of managing their own lives, let alone the lives of their chil-
dren. The libertarian approach is a much-needed step in the other
direction.
The libertarian approach offers the additional benefit of elim-
inating the adversarial conflict between mother and child. The
mother and her child are not pitted against each other in a contest
to determine whose rights will reign superior. A program that will
stop the slippery slide to maternal subrogation is a move in a posi-
tive direction.
Finally, the libertarian model offers a more expansive and re-
alistic definition of the family, rather than the antiquated assump-
tion that the nuclear heterosexual family is the only true
manifestation of a family. This approach does not assume that all
women without men are destined to live their lives in economic
despair and poverty. Although it is true that women and children
are disproportionately poor,258 there are women with children who
are capable of surviving without the state or a man. The manner
in which the phenomenon is framed dictates the paths that can be
chosen. For example, if women and children in poverty were
viewed as being poor not because they are incapable of surviving
without men, but rather, because the necessary social support
mechanisms 25 9 are nonexistent, the issue looks entirely different.
257. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
258. Sixteen percent of all families live in poverty as compared to 46% of fami-
lies headed by women. Census Report, supra note 7, at 24.
259. These include such things as full and equal political participation, competi-
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With this perspective, one can readily conceive of a system that
would allow women the freedom and autonomy to choose the com-
position and direction of their families.
2. The Disadvantages of the Libertarian Model
While the libertarian model has much to offer, it also has dis-
turbing shortcomings. Its greatest detriment is that some
nonmarital children will not receive the same legal and economic
benefits as children with parents who are married to each other.
Some children also will not have the social, psychological, and
emotional benefits that they would have had if they knew with
certainty the identity of their fathers. This shortcoming, in and of
itself, may be sufficient to rule out the libertarian approach as a
model for paternity adjudication; it may not be in the child's best
interests. It is, however, preferable to avoid a situation in which
the interests of the child dictate the interests of the mother. The
interests of all the parties must be taken into consideration.
Another significant, and perhaps equally fatal, disadvantage
is that under the libertarian approach, the state will be responsi-
ble for the economic support of more children than it would be
under the alternative models. This is a direct result of establishing
nonmarital paternity for fewer fathers with sufficient economic re-
sources. Under the libertarian model, more fathers would be able
to avoid parental support obligations.26o Given the intense hostil-
ity generated when taxpayers are asked to support other people's
children2sl and policymakers' passionate distaste for AFDC, the
libertarian model will most likely remain an academic suggestion.
III. A Proposal for Reform
While each of the three models of intervention possess some
desirable characteristics, all possess unacceptable defects. A radi-
cal new vision is needed together with a radical restructuring of
the best approach to the phenomena of single women and their
children.
In a perfect world, adjudication of paternity would be the cul-
tural norm, rather than the exception, and the vast majority of
nonmarital children would have their paternity legally established.
tive wages, job opportunities outside of the pink-collar ghetto, safe housing and
child care.
260. Equally disadvantageous is that some of the fathers, such as those who have
no idea that they have fathered a child and who are not adjudicated as the fathers,
will not be able to share in the joys of parenthood.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 108-15.
[Vol. 8:567
SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN
This would put nonmarital children on an even footing with chil-
dren born to married parents and would give them the benefits to
which they are entitled. A perfect system also would foster a
sense of psychological and psychosocial security for the nonmarital
children and their parents. Society would benefit by the reduction
of public assistance payments and, perhaps more importantly, by
having parents who are responsible to and for their children. This
proposal has ramifications much broader than the paternity arena
alone.
Three values would influence the policy programs: choice,
maternal and familial empowerment, and retention of privacy and
dignity. Trust and responsibility are the values that must be con-
veyed to single mothers. A program set up with these values in
mind will avoid a system in which the mother and the child are
adversaries. The present adversarial format is an inherently inap-
propriate and ineffective system for resolving the conflicts and
tensions that may exist between a mother and her child.
The new system must facilitate and strongly encourage the
mother to establish paternity, while at the same time allowing her
to retain individual privacy, dignity, and choice. The goal is to
reach a point where mothers say, "I want to have my child's pater-
nity established because I know how important it is and this is one
thing that I can give my child."262 A further goal is getting fathers
to recognize that determining paternity and paternal obligation is
not something that they can avoid, and that they can take pride in
their responsibility and role in fostering the next generation.
This is not idealistic rhetoric. It is, admittedly, somewhat for-
eign to our notions of current practice. The first step is to educate
and intervene months, perhaps years, earlier, rather than waiting
until the children are born and their mothers are applying for pub-
lic assistance. With a situation of such magnitude--one-quarter of
all the children born each year-there is no longer time for piece-
meal attempts. Universal education and promotion of the benefits
and the necessity of establishing paternity, through all possible av-
enues, is desparately needed. These avenues include: schools, espe-
cially high schools; health clinics, including those offering prenatal
262. One researcher has found, in the course of interviewing teenaged mothers
that once they learn of the benefits that flow from establishment of paternity,
mothers are often enthusiastic and believe that this is one thing that they can actu-
ally give their children. Teenage mothers are often without resources and cannot
give their children all of the things that they would like to give. This provides
them with one mechanism for doing so. Series of interviews with Esther Wat-
tenberg (1988-89); See also Wattenberg, supra note 1.
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services; and hospitals and social service agencies.26 3 The advertis-
ing executives in this country are wizards at marketing the most
inane of products; it is reasonable to believe they can also market
the idea of choosing to establish the paternity of nonmarital
children.
Through this market inundation and education, we can give
to nonmarital parents all the tools that they need to make an in-
formed choice. It simply is not acceptable, nor consistent with our
long-held notions of parental autonomy and privacy, to attempt to
achieve universal estabishment of paternity through a governmen-
tal mandate. We owe it to the children of this country to try to do
what is best for them. We owe it to the parents of this country to
do it with the greatest amount of respect and concern for constitu-
tional protections. We owe it to the women of this country to halt
maternal subrogation.
Hospitals are one obvious avenue of education. They also
provide a similar model of informed consent. The mother and fa-
ther are most likely to' be present together at the hospital.264
Studies show that the longer the period of time that elapses after
birth, the less likely the mother will pursue establishment of pa-
ternity.265 Although hospitals routinely provide education regard-
ing the newborn infant and the availability of social services, few
make any effort to inform the parents about establishing pater-
nity. Some states require the father to acknowledge the child in
order to have the father's name listed on the birth certificate. 2s6
These acknowledgment forms, such as a Declaration of Parentage,
may be provided by the hospital if the hospital is so inclined.267 A
263. It would be possible to undertake a major media campaign using television,
radio, billboards and bus stops for public service messages.
264. Nichols-Casebolt, supra note 5, at 252.
265. Three recent studies examining the relationships between young, unmar-
ried parents found that during pregnancy 84% of the fathers of the unborn children
had a continuing relationship with the mother; 26 months after the birth of the
child 64% of the parents were in contact and that three years after the child's birth
only a little more than half, 55%, of the mothers were in contact with the fathers.
Williams, supra note 7, at 5.
266. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 18.50.160 (1989); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-2-112(3) (1990);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 3133(b) (1989); Fla. Stat. § 382.013(6)(b) (1990); Ga. Code
Ann. § 31-10-9(c)(2) (1989); Mass. Gen. L. ch. 46, § 13 (1990); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 440.280 (1989); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 192.005(a)(3) (Vernon 1990); Va.
Code Ann. § 32.1-257(D) (1989).
267. The author encountered several hospitals which refuse to offer even this ba-
sic service. One such hospital in a large, northern Minnesota city is run by Catholic
nuns who apparently do not want to support or encourage, in any way, the birth of
the nonmarital child. Perhaps things have not changed so significantly since the
days of Hester Prynne and the Puritans.
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sampling68 of the major hospitals in the Minneapolis-Saint Paul
metropolitan area showed that all of the hospitals contacted made
available the Declaration of Parentage and provided the necessary
sevices of a notary public. Yet, only one hospital provided written
information to the parents about establishing paternity and this in-
formation emphasized the financial liability that the father was
likely to incur, with little emphasis on the benefits to the child.269
Clinics and various health care providers, offering services to
women and children, are another avenue of education and infor-
mation. The goal here is similar to that of hospitals: to provide in-
formation, education, and support sufficient to allow mothers to
make informed decisions.
Once a mother makes an informed choice that it is in her
family's best interest to have the paternity of her nonmarital chil-
dren established, it is imperative that the vehicle for doing so is
not overly burdensome or intimidating. Various localities are ex-
perimenting with simplified paternity proceedings that substan-
tially reduce the usual problems of backlog, time, and expense.270
Mothers will not always choose to establish the paternity of
their children. But they remain the most aware of their unique
situations and the best able to judge whether or not it is in their
family's best interest to have the paternity of their nonmarital
children legally adjudicated. There may be stubborn mothers who
refuse to accept the implications of not pursuing establishment of
paternity. This is the price that the proposed model imposes. This
price is smaller than the price of allowing the constitutional rights
of women to be routinely abridged. This price is smaller than the
price to be paid by all women as it consistently becomes more ac-
ceptable to have maternal rights and interests subrogated to the
interests of children and even fetuses.
IV. Conclusion
The fact that twenty-five percent of the nation's children are
born to single women means policymakers must respond to the ur-
gent needs of these women and children. The sheer number of
children born to single women is at an extremely critical point, de-
manding well-informed and well-intended policies on poverty. The
interests of mothers, fathers, children and society alike must be
268. A list of hospitals contacted is on file with Law & Inequality.
269. The information is provided by the Hennepin County Medical Center in
Minneapolis, Minnesota.
270. Ideas for streamlining and improving paternity proceedings are many and
outside the scope of this article.
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considered and intertwined. The new policy must respect the con-
stitutional rights of the parents and reflect a passionate concern
about the needs of children. All of this must be accomplished
within the fiscal constraints of the social welfare system. The pro-
cedures for implementation are vitally important. Even more im-
portant is the rationale underlying the procedures. We can no
longer accept a system based upon antiquated notions of women's
subordination and a patriarchal family, or upon a belief in the
supremacy of the state budget over and against the rights of those
who have few resources.
